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Abstract That piracy needs to be addressed onshore is a widely shared assumption.
While the majority of counter-piracy measures focus on the sea, a number of onshore
counter-piracy initiatives have been launched. We can observe the seeds of an
alternative land-based policy approach. One set of land-based programs aims at
strengthening the legal and security state apparatus to better deter and punish pirates.
The other set of programs aims at addressing local populations on regional, clan or
village levels. Such projects aim at increasing surveillance, sensitizing populations
for the consequences of piracy, and providing rehabilitation or alternative livelihood
opportunities. In this article, I review the latter type of projects and discuss the
promises and difficulties of addressing piracy by such measures. I discuss five major
problems: knowledge problems, implementation problems, counterintuitive conse-
quences, tensions towards other parts of counter-piracy strategy, and the securitization
of aid.
Keywords Piracy . Somalia . Onshore solutions . Developmental responses . Security
development nexus
1 Introduction: addressing piracy onshore
"Piracy can be only fought on land." "Piracy needs to be tackled onshore." These
statements reflect a common wisdom in counter-piracy discourse: piracy is a problem
that needs to be addressed onshore. Yet, if we investigate the major measures
currently implemented to counter Somali piracy, we find that the majority of
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counter-piracy activities are maritime solutions. Naval patrols, transit corridors, escort
programs, the hardening of vessels, or the employment of private guards on board
vessels are measures that focus on the sea not on the land.1 Contrary to the common
wisdom, and despite growing criticism towards current policies, the majority of
activities addressing Somali piracy are maritime measures.
Yet, with the growing calls to fight piracy on land, more emphasis is being placed
on finding onshore answers to Somali piracy. Indeed a number of onshore initiatives
and pilot projects have been launched more recently. Two types of onshore projects
can be distinguished. Firstly, a range of programs relies on a law enforcement and
policing model. They aim at improving legal and police capacities in Somalia and the
wider East African region. These projects include security sector reforms, such as,
strengthening surveillance and coast guard capabilities. Or they aim at improving the
legal capacities to prosecute and sentence piracy suspects and conduct legal training,
develop prison capacities, victim support programs, or evidence collection capabili-
ties. Secondly, a range of projects relies on a development model in aiming at
addressing the root causes of piracy. They see solutions to piracy in development
programs. Such projects aim at preventing piracy through community based rehabil-
itation, reintegration, or preventive programs, awareness campaigns or alternative
livelihood projects. Rather than strengthening state capacities such projects address
local populations directly through cooperation with local authorities, such as, village
elders and collaboration with local NGOs or local economic actors.
In this article I review current projects that aim at addressing piracy onshore. My
main focus is on the second type of projects which foreground the importance of
development assistance. The majority of these projects have so far hardly achieved
any academic or public attention. If the common wisdom that piracy needs to be
tackled onshore is taken seriously, then it is an important task to evaluate the
contributions of onshore, development-oriented projects to counter piracy. What are
the promises and perils of the projects that present themselves as an alternative
approach to law enforcement and policing? Addressing piracy by developmental,
preventive means is a difficult affair. Not only is the efficiency of such projects
contested, but fears abound that they might even reinforce the piracy business. As I
will show in the following, there are severe problems and risks associated with these
projects and the direct impact of them has been limited so far. However, many of the
so-called root causes of piracy can only be addressed through such programs. It is
hence an imperative to carefully review these projects and consider how more
investments can be meaningfully made.
The article is structured in the following way. I firstly provide a brief overview of
the kinds of onshore projects and discuss the conceptual differences between security
and law-oriented projects and developmental projects. Secondly, I review current
projects in Somalia in greater detail. Thirdly, I discuss the main problems that arise in
implementing these projects. I focus on general hindrances to invest in such projects
and investigate the trade-offs and dilemmas that arise between development projects
and other objectives and counter-piracy measures.
1 For overviews of these measures see for instance Bahadur (2011), Bueger (2012), Geiss and Petrig
(2011), or Kraska (2011).
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2 Approaches to counter-piracy: an overview
The problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden and in the wider
Indian Ocean has led to an array of international activities. Indeed a complex
assemblage of various practices aims at addressing piracy (Bueger and Stockbruegger
2012). While this is not the place to give a comprehensive overview of these over-
lapping and sometimes contradictory practices,2 a meaningful brief overview can be
given in addressing two questions: firstly, where do the activities take place? Sec-
ondly, what type of general approach is taken, or phrased otherwise, how is piracy
addressed?
In answering the first question, we can distinguish between practice at sea and
at land. We can further differentiate the land-based practices by whether they
are conducted in Somalia or the wider region (including states, such as, Kenya,
Seychelles, Djibouti, or Pakistan). The second question leads us to at least four
different types of general approaches which treat piracy as a different type of problem
(Bueger 2012). The first is the security approach. It treats piracy to be an “existential
threat” to national and international security. Piracy is considered to be addressed by
primarily military means and the use of violence. The second approach treats piracy
to be primarily a deviant form of behavior that requires to be punished and be
addressed by law enforcement operations. Piracy is considered as a crime which
requires police responses. A third approach views piracy as a primarily technical
problem which can be addressed through adequate defensive measures, such as,
optimized transit corridors and optimal vessel hardening to prevent the success of
a piracy attack. A fourth approach sees piracy mainly as a development problem.
Piracy is treated as symptom of underdevelopment, that is, a problem of state failure,
weak governance, corruption, poverty, or unemployment. Seen as a development
problem, piracy is approached by means of development assistance or the repertoire
of peacebuilding measures.
Seen from the backdrop of this categorization, the majority of onshore projects fall
into the former two categories of security and law enforcement. A large number of
onshore projects directly or indirectly supports the naval operations in the Gulf of
Aden. Projects in the frame of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) counter-piracy program (UNODC 2011a, b) or the Djibouti process
organized by the International Maritime Organization (IMO 2011) aim at improving
law enforcement in the East African coast. They either develop regional law facilities
(courts, prisons, legal training) in countries including Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, or the
Seychelles and in the Somali semi-autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland.
Or they improve the security governance in the region through optimizing coast guard
facilities and training or through strengthened information sharing and surveillance.
Such projects operate on the assumption that countering piracy requires a strength-
ened legal and security state apparatus. They are partially reactive in that they develop
measures for the case that piracy suspects have been arrested. But they are also
preventive, in the sense that arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment are considered to
be viable deterrents which should be enforced by state governments.
2 See notably Bueger (2012), Bueger and Stockbruegger (2012), and Kraska (2011) for a discussion of the
interplay between different counter-piracy practices.
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Weak security governance is, however, only one of the factors that allows piracy to
thrive. As the literature has shown, cultural acceptability, domination of the populace,
and economic incentives induced by poverty and the lack of income and employment
opportunities are others.3 It is exactly these issues that alternative approaches aim at
addressing and thereby complement the marine deterrence and law enforcement
counter-piracy program. With the goals of reducing the legitimacy of piracy in
Somalia and providing alternative opportunities for a decent living, the lines of
counter-piracy policy and the wider development, peace building, and state building
policies of the international community in Somalia become blurred. After all, reduc-
ing poverty is one of the main goals of development policy. A clear line between
counter-piracy policy and the general development policy towards Somalia cannot be
drawn. Yet, a number of projects have been initiated that want to directly target the
problem of piracy.
In the following, I discuss these projects. I suggest that it is useful to differentiate
between four different ways in which projects use a developmental repertoire of
measures to address piracy. These are firstly, projects that want to prevent piracy through
surveillance; secondly, projects that conduct prevention campaigns; thirdly, projects
conducting rehabilitation and reintegration with former pirates, and, fourthly, projects
which want to offer alternative livelihood opportunities. In what follows, I discuss
current projects which follow these four lines. I proceed in outlining some of the
dilemmas such alternative counter-piracy approaches are facing.
3 Prevention through surveillance: "we know what you are doing"
A first set of projects aims at furthering land-based surveillance of potential piracy
activities. These projects mainly remain within a law enforcement paradigm; they aim at
reducing the response time to potential piracy operations and allow for better early
warning information for the shipping industry (concerning potential mother ships and
areas in which pirate groups operate). The collection of information on piracy activities
has, however, also additional benefits. It firstly integrates local villages and coastal
communities in counter-piracy policy. Through contacting information collecting
points, local communities can de facto do something against pirates. They can partic-
ipate in counter-piracy campaigns. Hence, in the longer run information collection
provides a pathway of cooperating with local communities. Increased surveillance is,
secondly, a deterrent. If pirate gangs recognize that they are being watched, they might
be more reluctant to carry out operations.
Strengthening surveillance and collecting local information is one of the pillars of the
IMO organized Djibouti Process. However, even non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) inside Somalia collect piracy information. One instance is the NGO "Peacelink."
Based in Mogadishu, and with offices across south central Somalia since May 2011,
Peacelink conducts onshore monitoring and surveillance of piracy activities (Peacelink
2011). To some degree also, local media outlets and information services, such as,
Somalia Report provide such surveillance services.
3 See among others Vagg (1995), Hastings (2009), Percy and Shortland (2009, 2011) for a discussion of
these factors.
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In summary, apart from contributing to a law enforcement model, the surveillance
approach can potentially strengthen the links to coastal communities, provides
potential seeds of cooperation between internationals and locals and encourages local
populations that they can act meaningfully against piracy. Strengthening such partner-
ships is important in the longer run and can also enable mutual confidence building.
The impact of these projects on piracy is, however, indirect. Yet we can reasonably
expect that they are one tool of undermining local support for piracy.
4 Cultural and moral prevention campaigns: "don't become a pirate!"
A second approach is constituted by public campaigns directed at potential pirates.
Such campaigns aim at raising awareness that piracy is illegitimate and that partic-
ipating in it has direct consequences. In military language, public campaigns aim at
winning the “hearts and minds” of potential pirates and convincing them not to
participate in piracy operations. Seen from the perspective of deterrence theory, they
constitute a form of “deterrence by denial” (Knopf 2010: 10). “In contrast to
deterrence by punishment, which threatens to inflict costs through retaliation after
an attack, denial strategies aim to dissuade a potential attacker by convincing them
that the effort will not succeed and they will be denied the benefits they hope to
obtain” (Knopf 2010: 10).
Several initiatives follow such an approach and have implemented public information
campaigns which disseminate the message that participating in piracy operations may
have severe consequences, including, imprisonment or death and that piracy operations
have a high risk of failure. They also propagate that piracy is immoral and conflicts with
the local culture and traditions. Several kinds of communication channels are used to
reach Somalis, including radio and TV broadcasting, events in villages, or handing out
leaflets and other publication materials.
Designing and implementing public awareness campaigns was initially on the agenda
of the UN Contact Group to Counter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the main
governance vehicle organizing international counter-piracy policy. The Contact Group's
Working Group 4 aimed at deliberating possibilities for information campaigns.
However, the working group produced little visible or tangible outcomes in terms
of concrete projects. Nonetheless, the mere existence of the working group is
important to keep the public awareness approach on the international agenda. Indeed,
a number of public awareness campaigns were organized by other actors.
Arguably, the public awareness approach was spearheaded by the Government of
Puntland. Three months after his election in January 2009, president Abdirahman Farole
launched a grassroots counter-piracy program spearheaded by Sheikh Abdulkhadar Nur
Farah (Bahadur 2011: 111). “In what was described as an “educational and spiritual
campaign” to discourage new recruits, the government offered total amnesty to any
former pirate agreeing to give up the trade” (Bahadur 2011: 111). As Garoweonline
(2011) reported on the campaign:
"All mosques in Garowe focused Friday's weekly sermon on the negative
impact of piracy on the local community. The preacher at Garowe's Sahaba
Mosque spoke both in Somali and Arabic languages, citing Islamic sources that
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explicitly prohibit ‘criminal acts like piracy.’ ‘All forms of roadblocks are
haram [prohibited] in Islam. Our religion instructs us to give safe passage to
all travelers, by sea or by land,’ the preacher told hundreds of congregants. He
spoke in detail about the many social problems pirates have brought to Puntland,
namely increase in the sale and consumption of alcohol, the use of the narcotic
drug khat and other un-Islamic acts such as adultery and fornication. The
preacher offered three stories as typical examples of pirates' negative social
impact on local communities. In one example, he strongly warned against the
spread of HIV/AIDS in the community as ‘prostitutes from everywhere’ have
been drawn to Puntland by the pirates' ransom money."
The campaign launched in April 2009, however, faded out quickly partially due to
the lack of funding. This gap was, however, filled by the NGO Norwegian Church
Aid. Contemporary public awareness campaigns are run by NATO, by the Norwegian
Church Aid, and in October 2011, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) launched a major new public awareness program.
NATO conducts an awareness project which is constituted by the broadcast of
counter piracy messages (NATO 2011). The message is broadcasted in English and
Somali on Somali radio stations. The message encourages "Somalia people to stay
out of piracy business" (NATO 2011). The broadcast informs about the counter-
piracy operations carried out in the Gulf and warns about the dangers of piracy in
stressing that many pirates “will stay in prison for years instead of being with their
families,” that the number of pirates in jail continuously raise, and that “pirates are
putting their lives in danger every time they sail armed with intent to hijack” (NATO
2011). The problem with this broadcast, which starts with the line "This is a message
from NATO…" (NATO 2011), is that it is easily perceived as propaganda from an
outside military organization. Broadcasting radio messages or dropping leaflets is
part of NATO's conventional repertoire of war faring and counter insurgency.4
NATO’s approach highlights the risk that if counter-piracy messages are understood
as outside propaganda and are not sufficiently sensitive to the local context, that they
may have little effect. NATO, however, here most likely takes a "better than nothing"
approach. Broadcasting might have some positive benefits at relatively low costs.
However, if we consider how a commercial we hear on our most favorite radio
station actually affects us in our daily life, the effects of this approach may be
evaluated as rather marginal and it is doubtful that the campaign reaches prospective
pirates. Yet, NATO's broadcasting campaign should be seen in the light of its
larger approach of increasingly cooperating and communicating with village elders
(NATO 2010).
Arguably, the more valuable approach is the one taken by NGOs, since they embed
the broadcasting of messages in wider projects of working with villages and clans and
using local authorities to spread the counter-piracy message. On of such more extended
projects is the one implemented by Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). It runs in cooper-
ation with the Government of Puntland' s Ministry of Justice, Religious Affairs and
Rehabilitation, a Norwegian insurance company, the Norwegian Shipowners Asso-
ciation and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs a project titled “Anti-piracy
4 See for instance the campaigns NATO launched in Afghanistan (U.S. Airforce 2007)
20 C. Bueger
measures through awareness raising, training and alternative livelihood in Puntland”.
The three year project has a budget of 850.000 Euros, and "aims to promote
awareness of the negative effects of piracy as well as provide improved livelihoods
for 1,200 ex-pirates" (SSRRC 2010). NCA works in Puntland coastal areas and
combines the awareness campaign with a rehabilitation and re-integration project
(reviewed in the next section).
NCA’s approach is centered on the collaboration with village authorities, clan
elders and religious leaders. Following a 2010 evaluation of NCA activities
conducted by Acacia Consultants, the awareness campaign has the following
components:
& "Capacity development of religious leaders as key duty bearers to use religion to
demonstrate the ills of piracy.
& Conducting anti-piracy campaigns and rallies,
& Use of Friday ’juma’ sermons in Mosques across the state to pass structured
messages on anti-piracy,
& Holding workshops with key stakeholders including community institutions to
create awareness on anti-piracy,
& Use of print, radio and audio media channels to pass messages to youths, duty
bearers, active pirates and entire communities,
& Organizing inter-school games tournaments, specifically targeting youths and
communities in the school environs to pass anti-piracy messages" (Acacia and
NCA 2010: 25)
NCA primarily works with religious leaders’, elders’ and women’s groups.
Women’s groups such as the Somalia Women Vision (SWV) of Puntland carry
out anti-piracy advocacy through training workshops and public fora. Following the
evaluation,
"SWV managed to create awareness to 90 youth who were in piracy business
before. They had targeted 5 villages drawn from Garowe, Bosaso, Bargal, Ely
and Pandar Mbalya which are the hotspots for piracy activities. In Garowe, over
100, mainly pirates, participated in the public fora." (Acacia and NCA 2010:
26).
A second core group is religious leaders. The interviews with religious leaders
conducted in the frame of the evaluation revealed that
"religious leaders confirmed that the NCA trained them on effective communica-
tion skills so as they are able to dialogue and pass the correct message amicably.
Besides holding public address forums in the villages which are mainly affected,
they have also included issues on piracy in preaching in the mosques." (Acacia and
NCA 2010:26).
In their work, NCA uses and disseminates leaflets (NCA 2010). The leaflet has as
its core messages that "piracy money is unlawful in Islam," and that "piracy leads to
prison." The inside of the flyer lists reasons why not to engage in piracy ("piracy is
human destruction," "piracy spreads HIV/AIDS," "be careful about piracy it leads to
hell," or "ransom can't help you after death") as well as advice ("if you are lost, ask
Drops in the bucket? A review of onshore responses to Somali piracy 21
the religious leaders") and calls for engagement ("Be an adviser to everyone about
piracy"). The main undertone of the flyer is clearly religious, with references being
made to Islam (unlawful in Islam, leads to hell, ask religious leaders).
The evaluation comes to the conclusion that the campaigns have been a relative
success, but that they need to be significantly expanded. As a core success, the
evaluation highlights that "3 villages have declared zero tolerance to the piracy activities
and their villages declared a no-go-zone for pirates. In a matter of time, 3 other villages
are expected to make similar declaration." (Arcadia and NCA 2010:26). However, it is
also stressed that the “efforts have completely converted the lifestyle of six pirates
who have quit piracy" (Acacia and NCA 2010: 26), which is everything but an
impressive number. Also, only three major rallies have been conducted, the number
of people reached remains limited as indicated by the numbers listed above (e.g., the
100 people reached by SWV).
The program launched by UNODC in late 2011 promises to significantly extend
the campaigning work of NCA. The project is an 18-month, US$1.1 million project
mainly funded by the UK government and the One Earth Future Foundation. The
project, which is currently in its first phase partners with former pirate leader and
financier "Boyah"5 and the Farole government to launch a large-scale multimedia
campaign that consists of the following elements:
& Broadcasting local success stories via radio, TV, SMS, and print media
& A radio series on two boys turning to piracy
& Awriting and song-writing competition
& Comic strips in local newspapers
& Caravans of elders, clerics, and women's groups. The caravan includes a big-screen
television on the back of a pick-up truck which broadcasts anti-piracy messages
and is supported by artists.
& Work with the diaspora
& "Celebrity appearances" from the Somali diaspora
& Travel by Farole to visit pirates in custody worldwide to disseminate the anti-piracy
message to the diaspora globally
The larger scale project of UNODC promises to continue the work of NCA and the
multimedia campaign most likely will also reach other districts beyond those the
NCA work could cover. It is moreover interesting since it attempts to integrate also
the diaspora in the counter-piracy work.
In summary, the awareness approach is important to sensitize locals and especially
youths to the fact that piracy has consequences and contains significant risks. Without
a doubt, the approach taken by NCA and UNODC is a more promising one then
NATO's limited broadcasting strategy. Yet, the NCA and even more the extended
UNODC approach is resource intensive, requires a deep immersion in local affairs. A
deeper rooted problem is, however, the moral approach taken by NCA, UNODC as
well as NATO. The approach is backed up by an NCA-sponsored survey, in which
85% of respondents suggested that working with religious leaders is the most
promising strategy (Rashid 2009). Moralizing piracy and casting the problem in
5 For some background on Boyah see Bahadur 2011.
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religious terms, however, may not necessarily reach especially the youths supportive
of piracy. These might be more interested in the alternative lifestyle and the social
prestige of being a pirate, rather than in complying with religion. Also, pointing to the
hazards of piracy does not necessarily have to be a success strategy. As is well-known
from displaying "smoking kills" messages on cigarette packages, knowing the con-
sequences does not necessarily or directly lead to a change in risk-taking behavior.
Moreover, and maybe most problematically, the campaigns face a significant con-
ceptual gap, since they do not engage so far with the core justifications of pirates
(Bueger et al 2011). Any enterprise requires a justification which projects it as
valuable and legitimate. The same is true for piracy. Pirates justify their operations by
claiming to defend their homeland and coastlines against foreign vessels, over-fishing,
and toxic dumping. As deterrence theorists have highlighted successful campaigns also
conduct de-legitimization (Knopf 2010). Such an approach aims at demonstrating that
the justifications for piracy are illegitimate, that piracy cannot by legitimized by a
good cause, such as, protecting the homeland. Since any criminal activity requires
legitimation, undermining justification patterns, may make it more difficult to piracy
financiers to recruit and to find local support. Finally, former and prospective pirates
require hope, that is, alternative perspectives of a decent living. It is this objective that
the third approach to onshore counter-piracy wants to achieve.
5 Rehabilitation and reintegration: "don't return to piracy!"
The public awareness campaign from the NCA project is combined with a third
approach, the attempt to rehabilitate and reintegrate former pirates. Individuals, who
already have participated in a piracy operation, have “valuable” operational experi-
ence and are hence likely to be re-employed. The majority of pirates do more than one
tour, not the least because the piracy lifestyle offers some pleasures and certain social
prestige, and the relatively remote ransom cash the average pirate foot soldier earns
(Bahadur (2011: 227) estimates sums between US$12.000 and US$42.000 depending
on the position within the operation) runs out quickly. Moreover, opting out of piracy
is not necessarily easy. Many families, subclans and clans reject piracy as illegitimate
and immoral business. The reformed pirate is hence not necessarily welcomed with
open arms in his families or villages. It is difficult to return to the life the pirate gave
up when joining pirate operations and as a former pirate it might become even more
difficult to find other employment or sources of income.
Such problems are well-known to the international community, since they are an
overall post-civil war phenomenon. Turning former combatants after civil wars to
citizens is an ongoing challenge in many post-war, peacebuilding contexts (Knight
2008). The response to the problem by the international community are so-called
Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration Programs (usually acronymized as
DDR). Although pirates are not combatants and piracy is not war, the program
initiated by NCA might well be understood as DDR-type programs, since it deals
with similar problems (SSRRC 2010).
NCA's program consists of two pillars, firstly, vocational training and, secondly,
business skill training and start off grants. Vocational training is conducted in the
vocational training centers in Garowe or Galkayo, and trainees receive training on
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welding, masonry, carpentry, basic electrical engineering, mechanics or driving.
Students are taught in a group of 50, and graduate after 3 months courses in a
"colorful ceremony" (Abdi 2011a). Upon graduation, participants are equipped with
a toolbox to make them ready for business. Following the NCA evaluation, NCA has
entered into an agreement with the Government Vocational Training Center to train
600 former pirates. The first group of trainees was graduated in autumn 2010. In the
second pillar, training in enterprise development is conducted by the local NGO,
Somali Relief and Development Organization (SORDO) in Garowe. In this training,
former pirates acquire business skills and are provided with start off capital of US
$300. In autumn 2010, 25 former pirates were in training, with 50 additional to receive
training.
Participants to the program have to go through a selection process, which involves
clan elders as well as governmental representatives.6 Applicants to the program have to
fulfill various criteria. They have to be from a coastal region, theymust be former pirates
or have been involved in piracy, the candidate has to sign his commitment and swear to
Allah; he should be aged between 15 and 45. Each candidate requires a guarantor from
his family or clan to make sure that the candidate behaves in a proper way, to ensure
against potential damages caused and also to validate that the candidate de facto has
been involved in piracy. The project strives to reach a balance between different clans
and also aims at considering minority clans. In the selection process, NCA cooperates
closely with the PuntlandMinistry of Education. The ministry has also the final word on
selecting a candidate. The selection procedure is one of the most sensitive issues of the
program. Firstly, because participation in the program involves some form of amnesty
and, secondly, as further discussed below, giving an individual a opportunity for training
(and a start-up grant) in a war shattered country such as Somalia, might be considered as
a de facto reward for piracy.
The NCA evaluation sees the main problems in the lack of effective capacities for
conducting training (facilities and trainers). The success of the program is so far unclear.
Reportedly a handful of former pirates has already found employment or started their
own business. One needs to await the next evaluation report to assess the efficacy of the
project. Although an innovative project, it remains in an "embryonic" state and requires
further development (Acacia and NCA 2010: VIII).
6 Alternative livelihood and other development projects: "do something
better with your life!"
A fourth approach centers on the idea that Somali requires "alternatives" to piracy,
that is, alternative sources of income and alternative professional identities. This
approach differs from the former as it is not centered on former pirates, but on
prospective ones. The assumption is that after decades of civil war, many Somali
are trained in the use of weapons and military tactics but have little other training.
Hence, their choice is largely one of joining militias and governmental armed forces
or engaging in piracy, while the trade-off is that piracy promises higher earnings (at,
6 Compare Interview conducted by Jan Stockbruegger with a representative of NCA, Nairobi, Kenya
October 2011.
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in some cases, a higher risk). While it is tempting to join a piracy gang, it is not
necessarily easy. Employment is competitive (rumors even suggest the existence of a
waiting list for joining piracy operations). Yet, people with some seafaring skills and
experience (that is often fishing experience) will find a pirate tour more easily. A former
pirate, who participated in the NCAprogram,was cited by Somalia Report as saying that
"they recruit indiscriminately, as long as the recruits fulfill the following requirements:
be a sea expert, be a proficient swimmer, be strong” (Abdi 2011b).
All this makes people from coastal towns, such as fishermen, more vulnerable to
piracy. Yet, a typical piracy operation not only consists of sea-going hijackers but also
entails jobs as watchmen, guardians, cooks, accountants, translators, or suppliers,
which do not necessarily require seafaring experience (Bahadur 2011). The goal of
alternative livelihood programs is to make individuals (notably those with seafaring
experience) aware that they have a choice and that they can choose an alternative to
the piracy professions. Providing such alternatives requires major development
assistance to the Somali economy and infrastructure. Hence, in the realm of this
approach, the lines between more general development assistance and counter-piracy
become blurred. Indeed, the main difference between a typical development assis-
tance project and a counter-piracy project is the emphasis they put on coastal villages
and communities, as the spaces where individuals are more vulnerable to piracy and
recruitment takes place.
Somalia remains in a difficult economic situation, and hence alternatives cannot be
easily created or offered. A number of proposals have been made on which issues
alternative livelihood projects may focus. Yet, projects that work within an alternative
livelihood approach to address piracy remain in the planning stage.
As one of the first proposals, the 2009 NCA survey with local actors identified
four core areas on which alternative livelihood projects should concentrate (Rashid
2009: 21): the improvement of fishery through the provision of fishing gear, the
improvement of small scale business through business training and the provision of
micro credit, artisanal crafts’ training, and livestock improvement projects for
pastoralists.
The main funding device for counter-piracy projects, the Trust Fund to
Support the Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
(hereafter, The Trust Fund) currently considers two alternative livelihood projects
(UNODC and UNDPA 2011a, b). One is a proposal by the International Labour
Organization and the UN Office for Project Services, which is planning to work with
Puntland youth to provide professional opportunities outside of piracy. The other one
is a project submitted by UNESCO, which aims to create opportunities for employ-
ment outside of piracy and promote skills such as conflict resolution or leadership in
south central Somalia and Puntland. Both projects basically aim at continuing the
work already conducted by the organizations, yet with a strengthened emphasis on
counter piracy.
At a 2011 fundraising conference organized by the United Arab Emirates, several
further potential projects were discussed. Two of the background papers to the
conference made a strong case for concentrating development responses to piracy
on the development of port cities, notably Puntland’s principal port of Bossasso
(Murphy and Saba 2011; Chorin et al. 2011). As argued, port development provides
infrastructure for the local economies to prosper as well as significant employment
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opportunities. Murphy and Saba (2011) further stress the importance of connector all
weather roads, linking the port to major cities. The building of linking roads would
demonstrate the seriousness of the commitment to assist Puntland and could reward
villages that stand against piracy. They also suggest complementing economic assis-
tance in developing the pastoral sector in improving the standards of Somali meat for
export, long-term and sustainable fisheries programs, the development of water
resources as well as mineral extraction.
As Murphy and Saba (2011) highlight, it will be important to coordinate such
projects, instead of working in a piecemeal approach. The impact of alternative
livelihood projects or economic infrastructure projects for counter-piracy policy will
remain indirect. Yet, such approaches can deliver an important reward for local com-
munities if they stand up against piracy and do not offer resources and sanctuary to
piracy gangs.
7 The promises and perils of onshore projects
As this review documents, some onshore counter-piracy projects have been
initiated or are planned. They are, however, only few. Indeed, considering the
number of Somali they reach, they are no more than drops in the bucket. In total,
the international community spends an estimated US$3 million for development-
oriented onshore counter-piracy projects. Leaving general aid streams to Somalia
aside, this contrasts with the estimated costs of the naval operations of US$2
billion, and an estimated sum of ransom paid of US$200 million (Bowden et al
2010).
Phrased otherwise, there remains a strong reluctance to finance onshore
counter-piracy programs. This is further underlined if we consider that by mid
2011 The Trust Fund, the main funding vehicle to counter piracy, has not
sponsored a single onshore, development-oriented project (UNODC and UNDPA
2011a,b). The Trust Fund prioritizes the sponsoring of projects which rely on a
security and law enforcement approach and increase state capacities. Several alternative
projects have been so far proposed to the Trust Fund, including projects addressed to
improving the fishing sector, community-based prevention projects or capacity building
in ports. Yet, out of nine projects, only the two proposals discussed above have been
generally accepted but are still being "held" for further clarifications (UNODC and
UNDPA 2011a,b).
What are the reasons for the few programs and the reluctance to invest in
onshore counter-piracy projects? A number of major reasons can be identified.
Below I discuss several of them clustered into five types of problems: (1)
knowledge problems, (2) implementation problems, (3) the counterintuitive consequen-
ces, (4) tensions towards other parts of counter-piracy strategy, and (5) the securitization
of aid.7
7 The following observations are based on a series of interviews conducted in Nairobi, Kenya in September




By knowledge or cognitive problems, I refer to problems that can be located in the
broader discourses of the international community on how to cope with phenomena
such as the failed state problematique or more distinct threats such as piracy. To start
with, there is a general reluctance within the international donor community to fund
preventive projects. This is not only a Somali problem, but a phenomenon that can be
observed across post-conflict and crisis prevention work.8 Secondly, this reluctance is
fed by an ongoing lack of knowledge of how to conduct preventive programs.9 Arguably
much of aid, development and state-building projects have failed so far to achieve the
promised outcomes, and this is even more the case in programs related to the
prevention of organized crime, local violence, or DDR. Thirdly, there is also the
more Somalia specific attitude that the international community should not intervene
in Somalia directly, but should act from a distance. This is not the least because of the
international trauma caused by the failures of 1990s intervention in Somalia and more
specifically the Black Hawk Down trauma.10 Investing in onshore measures in
Somalia requires close proximity to Somalia actors, partnerships, a direct form of
engagement and deep immersion and commitment on the village level.
7.2 General implementation problems
A second linked set of problems relates to the difficulties of organizing and implement-
ing projects in Somalia. This starts with basic security concerns, which has forced many
international NGO's to pull out of Somalia in the recent years. This is notably the case
in the piracy-infected areas of Puntland and Southern Somalia, in which there is a
high personal risk for aid workers. But it is also related to very practical implemen-
tation problems, such as how to transfer money and equipment into certain Somali
areas or how to communicate with local teams effectively. Secondly, there is a high
distrust in potential Somali cooperation partners. This distrust is fed by concerns of
corruption, the clandestine system, or organizational structures misfitting Western
bureaucratic structures, the perceived lack of accountability and control over how
funding is used, and last, but not least, concerns about the complicity of many
organizations (including governmental) in piracy. Provincial corruption remains one
of the main problems.
7.3 Potential counterintuitive consequences
A third set of problems that can be identified are concerns over the counterintuitive
consequences of onshore counter-piracy programs. Phrased otherwise, projects may
do more harm than good. These concerns are, firstly, fed by the meanwhile estab-
lished fact that some of the fishing equipment provided by international donors has
been used in piracy operations. Since one of the areas of work of alternative
livelihood projects is in fishery, there is the ongoing concern that the skills achieved
8 See, e.g., de Soto, Alvaro, and del Castillo (1994)
9 For a discussion of such knowledge problems, see among others Woodward (2007) and Paris (2010).
10 See, e.g., the discussion in Bryden and Brickhill (2010) and Menkhaus (2009).
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in vocational maritime training might be used to participate in piracy, or the donated
equipment is either directly used, or robbed and used in piracy. Secondly, there are
ongoing concerns over radical Islamism. One should not forget that the main concern
of many security actors in Somalia is that the country might become a safe haven for
Islamic terrorism, a second Afghanistan. Relying on religious leaders for conducting
awareness campaigns, inevitably strengthens the status of Islam in Somalia. Strength-
ening religion, leads in the mind-set of some security actors to concerns over
fundamentalism and terrorism.
7.4 Tensions between law enforcement and development
The reviewed onshore counter-piracy programs have, moreover, some obvious tensions
to the law enforcement model of countering piracy. Firstly, reintegration and rehabili-
tation projects are a de facto reward for piracy activity. Former pirates, many of whom
which will receive amnesty, are presented with opportunities (including education or
grants) that the majority of Somali youth do not have, or only achieve under more
difficult circumstances. Hence, re-education and reintegration programs potentially
undermine the deterrent of facing a life in prison.
Secondly, another tension relates to fishing as one of the areas of onshore projects.
One of the key problems of the maritime counter-piracy patrol system is how to
distinguish between a pirate operation and an “innocent” fishing tour. Evidence is often
problematic since, for instance, also fishermen tend to carry weapons for self-protection.
Indeed in the past, incidents have been reported that fishermen could have been harmed
by the navies patrolling the Gulf of Aden. The 2009 NCA survey suggests that these
reports have led fishermen to stay on land. For the navies, it is in their general interest to
have as few potentially suspicious vessels in the sea as possible. From the development
perspective, it is the opposite—it is to have as many fishermen out on the sea as possible
on whatever vessel.
7.5 The securitization of aid
A fifth set of problems relates to the attitude within the development community
working for Somalia. Since piracy is perceived as a security problem (and indeed
addressed primarily by security actors) and since there is the ongoing belief that
development and security concerns are better kept separate, there is a major gap or
disconnect between counter-piracy and development strategies. Firstly, there are ongo-
ing concerns, often dubbed as the "securitization of aid" that short-term security thinking
and priorities override development objectives, and that security-related considerations
in humanitarian or development projects undermine the status of aid agencies as neutral
actors.11 Secondly, major parts of the development community, notably those that
worked in Somalia for many years, doubt that piracy should be a top priority issue. As
a UNDP representative put it in an interview "Once the pirates are gone and with
them the foreign navies, we [UNDP] will still be here."12 From a development
11 For a discussion of the tense relationship between security and development actors see Abrahamsen
(2005), Chandler (2007), and Youngs (2008).
12 Author interview with UNDP Somalia representative, Nairobi, Kenya, September 2010.
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perspective, piracy might be indeed seen as a relatively marginal problem. Piracy
primarily exacerbates the level of insecurity in some villages, yet it is a problem that
does not compare with the reach of the food and shelter crisis, the problem of weak
infrastructures, poverty, or the ongoing war in the south of the country.
8 Conclusion: strengthening onshore preventive projects
Taken together these concerns, problems, and risks provide the major reasons for the
reluctance to engage and invest in onshore counter-piracy projects. While it will remain
important to be aware about these issues, it does not imply to disengage from onshore
programs. Onshore programs are a core and crucial component of counter-piracy. So far,
onshore developmental projects remain weakly coordinated and dispersed. A major
issue will be to rethink how such projects might be better coordinated. This concerns the
relationship between multilateral funding through The Trust Fund and bilateral funding;
it concerns the question of which working group of the contact group will coordinate
development-oriented projects, but also, maybe most fundamentally, it is an issue of the
relationship between counter-piracy policy and the general aid and development efforts
in Somalia. So far, counter-piracy and development policy streams are largely
disconnected.
Overall, it remains important to recognize that a large portion of the Somali popula-
tion is not on the side of the pirates or supports them only because they are "necessary
evils." Indeed, the 2009 NCA survey found that 95% of the respondents from coastal
towns oppose piracy. Moreover, the example of the town of Eyl, which used to be one
the main pirate nests, but, not least because of the projects reviewed above, has not been
used as a pirate base for roughly a year now, is a success case to keep in mind. For
villages, piracy activity brings, to some degree, business into town. There are economic
benefits from piracy for some. Yet, since pirates pay higher prices for common goods,
there is also a large array of economic losers that suffer from piracy-induced inflation.
Moreover, piracy activity also brings a significant level of insecurity and disorder to
villages. Pirates reinforce local insecurity through aggressive behavior, interpirate
violence and the proliferation of small arms. They increase the popularity of khat and
alcohol consumption as well as prostitution in villages. Several villages have started to
organize initiatives to do something against piracy locally. It will be in the interest of the
international community to support these local initiatives, assist them in driving pirates
out of their villages and towns, and offer them rewards for doing so.
Piracy will, however, remain an important source of income for many members of
the Somali society. It might be cynical, but piracy is not only, as we nowadays
frequently hear, a "business model", it is also a development model. Of course, not all
of the millions of ransom in dollars are invested in the Somali economy. As for
instance Jay Bahadur (2011) reports, much of the ransom money is invested in
consumption goods, such as, guns, khat, cars, or alcohol, imported from Kenya or
Ethiopia. Some of the ransom money might also flow to foreign countries. Some of it
is reinvested in piracy operations. Yet, the same time do we have reports of ransom
benefiting local communities and clans, being invested in houses, education, or even
infrastructure such as health services. While the development benefits of the influx of
ransom money are few, maybe too few, piracy means development for some. If the
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international community cannot prevent piracy as such, it should seek an answer
to the question of how piracy ransom can lead to real investments in Somalia,
instead of insecurity and crime. Perhaps what is needed is the "orderly pirate.”
That is, the pirate who does not invest his share of ransom money in guns, khat,
alcohol, prostitution, or cars but invests it in the Somali public infrastructure, in
contributing to housing, streets, schools, and education. Turning pirates into
good (pirate) citizens might be the true challenge of onshore counter-piracy
programs. It might, however, also imply that Somalia is to become more of a “pirate
state” than it is already.
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